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Abstract 
Nowadays many organizations share sensitive services 
through open network systems and this raises the need 
for an authorization framework that can interoperate 
even when the parties have no pre-existing 
relationships. Trust Negotiation is the process used to 
establish these first relationships, through the transfer 
of attributes, embedded in digital credentials, between 
the two parties. However, these attributes may 
themselves be considered sensitive and so may need 
protection from disclosure. In some environments, the 
policies that govern the protected services may also be 
considered sensitive and their release to arbitrary 
strangers may leak confidential business information. 
This paper describes a way to unify the protection of 
services, sensitive credentials and policies in a 
synchronized trustworthy manner. We propose a trust 
authorization framework (TAF) that builds on the 
capabilities of XACML to support the bilateral 
exchange of policies and credentials through trust 
negotiation.  
1. Introduction 
Authorization ensures that resources can be 
accessed only by parties who have the right privileges. 
Thus, the resource gatekeeper requires some level of 
trust be established before sensitive information can be 
released. Service requesters are required to submit 
sufficient authorization credentials before access will
be granted. Wherever people are involved in the 
exchange of digital information, such as personal, 
potentially sensitive credentials, privacy [15] [2] [7] 
becomes an issue of some concern, which raises an 
interesting paradox. To make the services and 
resources accessible to legitimate users an 
authorization infrastructure requires the users’ 
attributes. However, the users may not be ready to 
disclose their attributes to a remote service provider 
without determining exactly who the provider is and 
how their personal attributes will be used. One 
approach for addressing these privacy concerns is to 
employ a bilateral exchange of policies and credentials 
between the parties involved in the transaction, so that 
they can decide what to give and/or get from each 
other. This process is known as trust negotiation in the 
literature [8].  
Consider the following motivating example. A 
Secret Service (SS) offers online training both for its 
agents and friendly secret agent services. The service 
requires that each participant present a role Attribute 
Certificate (certificate), a security assertion digitally 
signed by the participant’s security authority, which 
binds the holder’s attributes to the holder. Whilst the 
policy that governs this service prevents unauthorized 
access to its resources, it does not protect the fact that 
SS offers training to friendly organizations, which is 
itself a sensitive piece of business information.  
To prevent arbitrary disclosure of sensitive policies, 
access to the policies themselves needs to be protected. 
On the other hand, an agent requester cannot give out 
her role certificate to any service that poses as the SS 
web server, and would like some proof that the server 
can be trusted.  To avoid the arbitrary disclosure of 
sensitive policies [2] and digital credentials, parties 
require a mechanism to gradually establish a trust 
relationship. Trust relationships can be established 
between service providers and requesters through the 
exchange of information in a well-understood fashion 
[10].  The information usually contains policies and 
security assertions, issued by Attribute Authorities 
(AAs), which describe the properties of the holders. 
The exchange of this information is done in such a 
manner that the security assertions are unforgeable and 
can be verified and validated [18]. 
Trust negotiation management systems have been 
proposed by researchers as one effective way to 
guarantee the confidentiality of authorization 
information. Trust establishment is a well-researched 
concept [5] [2] [6]. However, existing efforts in this 
area have not been standardized and do not fit into any 
authorization standard such as the eXtensible Access 
Control Markup Language (XACML) [3], which 
would provide the benefit of promoting interoperability 
and reducing the effort needed to integrate with 
existing applications. This work investigates how 
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XACML can fit into trust authorization management 
systems by exploring existing concepts, and where 
necessary, extending them to accomplish our goal.  
We describe our proposed XACML Trust 
Authorization Framework (XTAF). XTAF is a loosely 
coupled architecture with a trust component that 
protects authorization information (policies and 
credentials) layered such that it integrates seamlessly 
into any XACML compliant authorization engine with 
minimal effort. We expose different ways that the 
XACML policy language can be used to support 
bilateral exchange of policies and credentials, and 
protect unauthorized access to services. We introduce a 
Trust Authorization Service Handler (TASH) to handle 
trust and privacy of authorization information. This 
supports runtime bilateral authorization operations 
between two or more parties.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In 
section 2, we provide an overview of related work, 
highlighting some of the challenges. Section 3 gives a 
brief overview of the XACML authorization 
framework and the proposed XACML Trust 
Authorization Framework.  In section 4 we illustrate, 
through a hypothetical example, the usage of our 
framework. Section 5 concludes the paper with a 
summary. 
2. Related Works 
Seamons et el [13] [14] [11] [12] and Bertino et el 
[6] [8] have done useful works in the area of Trust 
Negotiation and Management, providing a good 
theoretical background on the concepts of trust with 
quite a number of implementation scenarios.  Seamons 
et el have advanced the notion of a trust negotiation 
protocol and strategy with some practical 
demonstration of how they can be implemented [10]. 
In the area of trust policy and language, Bertino et el 
have proposed a number of ways to encode policies 
and credentials [6]. However, these works are 
proprietary and cannot interoperate; thus investigating 
how the XACML framework can fit into trust 
management systems becomes important. 
Lorch et el [4] presented their first experience using 
XCAML in distributed systems, including the analysis 
of the performance of XACML with existing models, 
and highlighted its limitations.  They drew on 
experience gained in the integration of SAML [22] and 
XACML in distributed open systems and performance 
results based on the PRIMA model [19]. PRIMA is 
specifically designed for access control in grid 
computing environments: users can assign and/or 
delegate privileges to each other without involving 
policy administrators. However, Lorch et el focused 
mainly on the analysis of XACML’s performance and 
did not address the privacy issues and trustworthiness 
in distributed environments.  Our work is among the 
first to look into how XACML can be used to build 
trust relationships in distributed authorization 
environments. This is a significant direction since 
XACML is a generic access control model that has 
continued to address wider access control 
requirements.  
The Shibboleth infrastructure, an attempt to address 
privacy in an authorization environment, proposed two 
kinds of policies: Attribute Release Policy (ARP) and 
Attribute Acceptance Policy (AAP) [16]. Shibboleth is 
a distributed authentication architecture whose access 
control is based on users' attributes. Privacy in 
Shibboleth is primarily focused on using 
pseudonymity; however this does not completely 
protect privacy in an environment where the user may 
give other attributes in order to use the authorized 
resources. For instance, an institution may give a 
student a signed assertion, authorization token to 
access a discount online bookshop. But if the student 
wants to purchase a book, (s)he needs to provide other 
personal attributes such as credit card number, physical 
address for payment and delivery. In such a case, the 
user cannot determine whether a party can be trusted 
with sensitive attributes. Lorch et el also used WSPL, a 
profile of XACML that supports policy intersection to 
determine whether two policies are mutually amenable. 
This approach requires some policy on the server side 
to be released without negotiation, but then provides a 
very simple means for calculating what the client is 
willing to share.  
PERMIS [11] [18] is a middleware authorization 
framework, which focuses mainly on the role based 
access control (RBAC) model. PERMIS has 
successfully been implemented in a number of 
application scenarios with interesting results [19][20] 
[18]. It fully supports role hierarchy and its policy 
language is user friendly. It has a GUI policy editing 
tool [21] and Privilege Allocation (PA) subsystems for 
managing roles and permissions. The PERMIS 
language is limited in expressions and semantics 
compared to XACML. The PERMIS framework does 
not provide direct support for bilateral exchange of 
policies and credentials to address privacy issues. 
PERMIS has in its architecture a subsystem that signs, 
verifies and validates X.509 attribute certificates used 
to represent authorization credentials.  
Proceedings of the 2006 International Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia 
Networks (WoWMoM'06) 
0-7695-2593-8/06 $20.00 © 2006 IEEE 
3. XACML Trust Authorization Framework 
One promising mechanism to solve privacy and 
trust is the eXtensible Access Control Markup 
Language (XACML), a standard created in OASIS [3]. 
This standard defines a general-purpose, flexible 
authorization policy language and a query/response 
format. The XACML standard uses a generic access 
control framework based on the IETF/DMTF model 
that allows an enterprise to specify and deploy an 
access control policy for a variety of resources. Though
XACML is a rich framework, it intentionally does not 
address how to preserve the privacy of authorization 
entities.  
An architecture is required that can support trust 
and confidentiality at the same time. Access control 
techniques can be used to protect access to a party’s 
credentials, but to establish trust requires a gradual and 
progressive approach in the exchange of a party’s 
credentials. This entails a bilateral process, in which 
both parties can use access control policies to 
determine the way their attributes are given to each 
other, requiring a repeated exchange of policies and 
credentials as trust is progressively increased. In order 
to know which credentials to release, a subject must be 
sent a policy of the resource. If the subject is happy 
with the policy, it will release further credentials.  
Rather than taking all the risk of releasing sensitive 
attributes at once, parties are subject to smaller risk on 
an incremental basis and are able to withdraw at any 
point.   
                            
3.1 Trust Authorization Architecture 
Figure 1 shows the basic building block of XACML 
Trust Authorization Framework. Core XACML 
components are described in [3]. We introduce a Trust 
Authorization Service Handler (TASH), a component 
added to the core XACML model to address the 
aspects of privacy and trust in distributed authorization 
environments. In the normal XACML approach, the 
Policy Decision Point (PDP) requests attribute values 
from the ContextHandler. In theory, the 
ContextHandler can query the Policy Information Point 
(PIP) for the attributes; in SunXACML, the AFM 
(Attribute Finder Module) [17] does the job of finding 
attributes that were not in the initial request context. 
The proposed service is being implemented as a Trust 
Negotiation (TN) server integrated via a SunXACML 
AFM to the core XACML engine, allowing the TASH 
to work seamlessly with the XACML engine.  In 
TASH, the Negotiation Protocol Module (NPM) 
handles the trust negotiation protocols and ordering of 
messages [10] during the building of a trust 
relationship. The Attribute Validation Engine (AVE) 
verifies and validates every credential attribute and 
policy that is received by the system before passing it 
to the trust decision engine. The Trust Information 
Handler (TIH) is responsible for the canonical 
representation of the inputs consumed by the TrustPDP 
and the outputs from it.  
The TrustPDP handles trust access management 
decisions by comparing local policies with received 
credentials and received policies with local credentials. 
The TrustPDP performs trust access management 
decisions in two ways: 
? It checks whether there are any local credentials 
(and policies) that can be disclosed by comparing 
the received credentials with the local policy. 
This is a necessary but not sufficient step for 
releasing further local credentials (and policies). 
? It checks the received policy to see whether there 
is sufficient benefit to be gained from releasing 
further local credentials. When the recipient is a 
human user, he or she can be asked to make a 
decision. When the recipient is a service being 
accessed by a user, then there may be no received 
policy but it may still be beneficial to the service 
to release further local credentials and policies. 
Both parties in the exchange require a TASH in 
order to engage in a trust building session.  
3.2 XACML Trust Policy Set 
The XACML language provides several ways to 
form a negotiation policy set. To enable the gradual 
building of trust, we arrange access control policies as 
directed policy graphs or trees [10], enabling the 
sequence and ordering of disclosure policies to be 
discovered at runtime. A node at any level is a pre-
Figure 1. XACML Trust Authorization Architecture 
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condition for evaluating that branch of the graph and 
for continuing to process the other parts of the graph. 
Similarly, in XACML, each Target at any node of the 
tree is an intersection of Targets in the path that leads 
to that branch of the tree.  This demands that if the 
Target at any level evaluates false, evaluating that 
branch of the tree becomes needless.  
We examine two pragmatic ways in which the 
XACML policy language can be used to form an 
effective trust negotiation policy set. One approach is 
to use the existing PolicySet container depicted in 
figure 2, which can be considered as a tree containing 
one or more children: PolicySet or Policy. A Policy on 
the other hand contains one or more child elements: 
Rule, and a PolicyId attribute. Thus, in PolicySet, each
Policy can specify a disclosure policy. The sequence 
and ordering can be determined by using the notion of 
PolicyIds, to specify the order in which the policies are 
disclosed at runtime. We give a simple example here. 
Alice wants to access webserver1 protected by policy 
p2, which specifies that the subject must be a nuclear 
research student in the computing department of the 
University of Salford. We assume that p2 is considered 
sensitive, so that its disclosure is controlled by another 
policy p1. It can only be disclosed to a subject with a 
proof of affiliation with the University of Salford. We 
can implicitly specify a generic requirement in the 
PolicySet Target, then p1 and p2 as policies in the 
PolicySet, but with p2’s policyId as the attribute of the 
protected Resource in p1. Here, p2 is disclosed only if 
p1 is evaluated to true. Thus, the idea of a PolicySet, in 
theory can be used to construct effective trust 
negotiation policy set, whose order can be determined, 
but requires good crafting skills. However, this 
introduces a computational overhead, in that 
processing of the policy requires the evaluation of two 
pre-conditions: PolicySet Target and Policy Target,
before the Policy Rule is evaluated.  
A second approach is to make use of the RuleId
attribute of the Rule container, since a Policy can 
contain one or more Rule elements, as shown in figure 
3. In this case, a Rule can be made to point to another 
Rule in order to protect that Rule from disclosure to 
arbitrary strangers using the RuleId. The sequence and 
order of disclosure can be determined simply by 
finding the relationships between the Rule containers. 
This model is less complex, and has less computational 
overhead. Again, Rule containers can be used to 
express fine-grained disclosure policies, and additional 
constraints can be enforced in each rule by using the 
XACML Conditions and Obligations in a more refined 
way.  We adopt this model as an efficient way to 
construct a simple, effective trust policy set. Though, 
in some environments, the first approach can be more 
effective, especially where policies are defined by a 
hierarchy of authorities to protect authorization 
information flow. 
At trust session runtime, an effective disclosure 
trust policy set is constructed from the applicable 
Policy, from which it can infer the order of disclosure 
by setting the source and sink nodes [12]. Then trust 
can progressively be negotiated with a remote party. 
The policies satisfied during the negotiation phase are 
eliminated until the sink node is satisfied or the session 
fails. The trust level and what each party is ready to 
Figure 2. The XACML PolicySet 
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give in exchange for his own information is determined 
by the ordering of the policy set.  
4.  Discussions 
In [13] it was mentioned that policy disclosures are 
vulnerable to probing attacks. As a result an adversary 
can use policy disclosure techniques to learn of a 
party’s possession or non-possession of the 
information being asked for.  It is also possible for an 
attacker to lie by expressing constraints on credentials 
or services that (s)he does not possess in order to 
gather information from the attacked. Thus, it is 
important that both parties receive what they expected 
and none gains undue advantage [23]. Our exchange 
protocol uses a gradual, incremental release of 
information based on a finer trust policy layering that 
specifies the order in which policies and attributes can 
be disclosed. 
We illustrate our exchange protocol with a simple 
example illustrated in figure 4. A CIA agent wants to 
gain access to a CIA web service that is hidden behind 
a publicly accessible service. Alice, a CIA agent asks 
for a protected electronic resource resCIA, governed by 
policy Pres, but is unwilling to give up her role attribute 
certificate roleCert until she is confident that she is 
communicating with a CIA server. This is specified in 
ARProle. But Pres cannot be disclosed to arbitrary 
strangers, so it is protected by another policy P.  Alice 
also cannot disclose the access requirement of roleCert -
ARProle to arbitrary strangers, so ARProle is governed by 
another policy ARPp1 stating that only US government 
certified servers can read ARProle. When Alice requests 
access to resCIA, the server instead of disclosing Pres,
returns policy P to Alice, which says that Pres, can only 
be disclosed to US government employees   
(USGovtcert).  
It is apparent therefore that the first round of policy 
disclosures is not tightly coupled to resources resCIA 
and roleCert. The assumption is that the kick-off 
policies cannot explicitly reveal whether both parties 
possess the required credentials or services. This 
suggests that both Alice’s and the server's behaviour 
cannot reveal non-possession or possession at the first 
round of iteration. Again, if the server gives out 
USGovtServerCert and Alice fails to respond with 
credentials that can satisfy the server’s disclosure 
policy, the negotiation can fail at this point.  This is 
fair: the server has given one of its properties, but 
neither the access requirements for the sensitive 
resource nor the resource itself have been disclosed. 
For trust negotiation to succeed, the policy and 
credential flow must advance the level of trust, which 
minimizes the effect of probing attack or lying under 
false policy expression. This is what makes our 
approach pragmatic and optimistic. The negotiators 
must possess a set of credentials (but, of course, this is 
natural) in order that access control policies can be 
used to determine the order in which those credentials 
can be released to advance the trust building session.  
5. Conclusions 
We have demonstrated how the XACML model can 
be explored to enable privacy and trust whilst 
protecting access to electronic resources in a 
synchronized manner. We described how to construct 
effective trust policy sets, which can optimize trust 
establishment sessions, and propose a new trust layer 
component in the primitive XACML model. We have 
leveraged trust concepts already proposed by 
researchers and show how our model optimistically 
addresses the problem of probing attacks such that the 
risk to which a party is exposed at any point in the 
negotiation can be minimized. Our framework has the 
capabilities to protect resources, policies and 
credentials simultaneously in distributed environment 
for users with or without pre-existing trust 
relationships. The implementation of this framework is 
in an advanced stage using the SunXACML 
implementation [17] and the PERMIS Attribute 
Verifier subsystem. 
Figure  4.  A Simple Negotiation Sequence 
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